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ABSTRACT
th

This essay commemorates the 30 anniversary of
the publication of Félix Guattari’s The Three
Ecologies. It does so by proposing a ‘diffractive’
reading of the book, suggesting latent potential in
each of the overlapping “ecologies” that
conformed the ecosophy sketched by Guattari.
There are mainly two aspects of The Three
Ecologies addressed in this essay. Firstly, the
understanding of the general frame of the
interrelation of the three ecologies as an
“intersectional” approach. Secondly, the
understanding of this form of intersectionality as a
possible platform to acknowledge other-thanhuman ‘intersections’. Through the essay I
exemplify with one of my own design projects to
help situating the claims and the questions raised.
Finally, I propose a multimodal explorative
framework of the three ecologies to explicitly
articulate human and other-than-human beings
inter and intra-relatedness.

“… phenomena—whether lizards, electrons, or
humans—exist only as a result of, and as part of, the
world’s ongoing intra-activity, its dynamic and
contingent differentiation into specific relationalities.
‘We humans’ don’t make it so, not by dint of our own
will, and not on our own. But through our advances, we
participate in bringing forth the world in its specificity,
including ourselves. We have to meet the universe
halfway, to move toward what may come to be in ways
that are accountable for our part in the world’s
differential becoming. All real living is meeting. And
each meeting matters.”
Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway

INTERSECTIONAL AND DIFFRACTED
In his book The Three Ecologies, Félix Guattari
sketched an ethico-political articulation that he called an
ecosophy, which was based on three ecological
registers: a mental (or psychological) ecology, a social
ecology and an environmental ecology, all
simultaneously present and mutually influencing,
‘overlapping’ or ‘intersecting’.
Interestingly, the term intersectionality was coined by
Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, the same year of the
publication of Guattari’s Les Trois Écologies, translated
eleven years later into English as The Three Ecologies.
Both Crenshaw and Guattari gave names and created
methods to articulate the inter and intra-related aspects
that overlap and simultaneously coexist which influence
the life conditions of human beings. Crenshaw was
concerned with the articulation of the social dimensions
of power dynamics oppressing women in the USA,
more particularly, of “Black women” that will lead her
to write a “black feminist criticism” (1989; 139).
Crenshaw saw how “Black women” were “theoretically
erased” (1989; 139) from feminist discourses of that
time and used the concept of intersectionality to make
theoretically explicit that the ‘sections’ or layers
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understood separately partly enacted oppression. From
the intersection of them emerged the possibility of
creating new registers, new sensibilities by which we
could make sense of things.1 One could say that she
‘diffracted’ the “social register” of feminist thinkers of
that time to render ‘visible’ power dynamics affecting
some human groups. One could also say, in a Guattarian
sense, that she added registers to a social ecology.
However, Karen Barad, elaborating on Donna Haraway,
has been careful to point out that the notion of
diffraction relies on an optical metaphor which implies
the difficulty, and the challenge to avoid thinking
“reflexivity” in terms of representationalism:
“Reflexivity takes for granted the idea that
representations reflect (social or natural) reality. That is,
reflexivity is based on the belief that practices of
representing have no effect on the objects of
investigation and that we have a kind of access to
representations that we don’t have to the objects
themselves. Reflexivity, like reflection, still holds the
world at a distance… calling a method ‘diffractive’ in
analogy with the physical phenomenon of diffraction
does not imply that the method itself is analogical. On
the contrary, my aim is to disrupt the widespread
reliance on an existing optical metaphor —namely,
reflection— that is set up to look for homologies and
analogies between separate entities. By contrast,
diffraction, as I argue, does not concern homologies but
attends to specific material entanglements” (Barad
2007; 87-88 emphasis in the original).
Barad coined the term intra-action to explicate and
study entanglements and relationalities through
material-discursive practices. Intra-action is a dynamic
concept (to be understood in terms of processes) that
emphasizes agency, not as an inherent property of a
thing or an individual (which might be taken for granted
through the notion of inter-action) but as relational
becoming. “Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing
reconfigurings of the world” (2007; 141). Through this
conception, ‘things’ are ethico-onto-epistemologically
constitutive of each other. We are always in the middle.
Following Barad, the intra and inter-actions to be
considered throughout this essay are meant to
counteract binaries such as natural-artificial and allow
us instead to conceive the continuum through
differences of degree and intensity. It also implies that
the diffractive approach expands the original visual
metaphoric analogy. Guattari wrote “We need to ‘kick
1
Ten years earlier, Gregory Bateson had written “two
descriptions are better than one” (2002 [1979]; 63) and argued
that “news of difference” (information) is produced when a
second source imposes a sub classification that was previously
impossible. For example, how information about depth is
created by binocular vision (two eyes). From which emerges
an aggregate that “is greater than the sum of its parts because
the combining of the parts is not a simple adding but is of the
nature of multiplication or a fractionation, or the creation of a
logical product.” Bateson 2002 [1979]; 80-81.
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the habit’ of sedative discourse… in order to be able to
apprehend the world through the interchangeable lenses
or points of view of the three ecologies” (2008; 28). In
this sense, we may nuance the transversal ethicoaesthetic paradigm that Guattari’s process-oriented
approach2 sought to enact, with renewed concepts for
“accounting for how practices matter” (Barad 2007; 90),
expanding his primary visual metaphor of the “lenses”
in an attempt to engage in a diffracting that disrupts
anthropocentric visual registers and enacts
multisensorial speculation.
I suggest that Guattari’s ‘macro intersectional’ frame
facilitates a relational approach that, if explored through
diffraction, would allow to articulate and investigate
registers, making sense of myriad aspects that affect and
enact ecologies. If Crenshaw’s diffraction of a social
register made (and continues to make) possible to
articulate certain human power dynamics and
circumstances affecting particular groups of women3,
today, it is also possible to understand the more radical
onto-epistemological erasure of other-than-human
beings. If, for example, the diffraction of a social
register gave Crenshaw the “intersection” sexism and
racism as something “greater than the sum of racism
and sexism” (1989; 140) because the laws of the time
took for granted the norms of white women or those of
black men, then, the diffraction of an environmental
register, may unfold the multiple ways in which
physical and chemical elements and conditions inter and
intra-act with human beings, but also the behavioural
aspects of myriad others that participate in the enaction
of these realities at multiple scales. An environmental
ecology that not only articulates the relations of a
human as she is affected by the wind, the sun, the
textures of the cotton buds that she collects and the
chemicals of the cotton fields that she absorbs through
her body, but also the semiotic registers of the wasp that
parasitizes the eggs of the cotton weevil that has
recently been feeding on the blade of the plant that
releases these signs.4 That is, an environmental ecology
diffracted and conceived through the overlap with those
of other beings.

FROM HUMAN-OTHER TO OTHER-THANHUMAN AND BACK, AND AGAIN, AND
AGAIN
If we reconsider Guattari’s three ecologies as a frame or
conceptual model, as a device to think with, we could
2

A “logic of intensities or eco-logic” (Guattari 2008; 30). The
notion of transversality was crucial to Guattari (see: Genosko
in Guattari 2008; 46), and through this essay, transversality
continues to be explored together with its potential for transdimensionality and trans-sensoriality.
3
For a contemporary overview of intersectional approaches
see Hill Collins and Bilge 2016.
4
For a biosemiotic description of these type of multitrophic
plant-herbivore-parasitoid-pathogen system see Bruni 2011.

appreciate that the psychological, the social and the
environmental ecologies were conceived to articulate
ecological complexity from a human point of view.
Guattari’s insight was not only the intersectional aspect
—the understanding that from the overlap, from the
confluence, of more than one section emerges
something “greater than the parts”— but also the explict
articulation of the psychological dimension as
generative (desire-production)5 and inextricably related
to the social and environmental dimensions. For
Guattari, to explicitly address the psychological register
was a way to critically engage with productionconsumption cycles of what he called “Integrated World
Capitalism”, which in his words “… tends increasingly
to decentre its sites of power, moving away from
structures producing goods and services towards
structures producing signs, syntax and – in particular,
through the control which it exercises over the media,
advertising, opinion polls, etc. – subjectivity (2008;
32).6 Through this framing, the human subject becomes
prominent in its capacity to engage not only with and
through environmental and social ecologies, but also
with and through ecologies of ideas and sensibilities
enacted in relation to sociological and environmental
ecologies. In this way, and as a conceptual model, the
three ecologies help us to appreciate the potential
combination of signs and encounters, internal and
external (intra-active) to any human being. The
acknowledgement of this complexity requires firstly, the
re-cognition and appreciation of intra-activity, and
secondly the re-cognition and appreciation of others’
differences and capabilities.
When speaking of a ‘human point of view’, I am not
suggesting a homogenous conception of ‘the human’, on
the contrary, there is no unitary ‘human’ view of
‘nature’; there is only differential becoming,
multiplicity and specificity. The same applies to otherthan-humans, this triple overlapping register could also
be used to frame studies and speculations upon other5
A recurring theme in Guattari as well as throughout his work
with Gilles Deleuze. See: Deleuze and Guattari 2009; 1986;
2004; 1994. See also Antonioli 2015.
6
Other models, such as the ‘triple bottom line’, the bestknown frame for ‘sustainability’, also consider three factors:
economic, environmental and social. However, by placing
economy as a separate category (outside of the social and
environmental) not only explicitly erases the register that
makes possible to consider the role of human subjectivity, but
also, by not being conceived as ‘ecologies’, miss the relational
and dependent aspect on and to ‘the environment’. The result
is a conception that separates through metric categories that
obscures the human dimension, social construction and
situated nature (dependency of local environments) of
economics. ‘Economy’ is fundamental to measure and create
conditions for and of exchange (of all kind of materialsemiotic flows) within society, but it is not bound to particular
forms of social interactions and is always dependent on human
values and material contexts. Relating to design, see our
earlier critique and work based on The Three Ecologies, Ávila,
Carpenter and Mazé 2010; also Antonioli 2015; Boenhert
2018.

than-human capacities and ways of being, to explore
their differential becoming, multiplicity and specificity.
Can we speak of psychological, social and
environmental ecologies of all living beings? Even
though what is understood as psychological in human
beings differs from the processes of individuation of
plants, all living beings establish degrees of social and
environmental relations. If we follow what Guattari
means by subjectivity, it is relevant to point out that for
him subjectivity is, at the same time, both collective and
auto-producing. Auto-producing, in reference to
Maturana and Varela’s notion of autopoiesis, and
collective in its sympoiesis,7 through emphasis on the
relational, historical and situatedness of the collective
becoming of subjectivity. This (transversalist) approach
to subjectivity eludes the individual-social distinction as
well as the conception of the subject either as a person
or individual.8 Through this definition the boundaries
psychological-social get even more diffuse; Barad
mentions that conceived intra-actively, beings, as
phenomena, “exist only as a result of, and as part of, the
world’s ongoing intra-activity, its dynamic and
contingent differentiation into specific relationalities…
All real living is meeting. And each meeting matters.”
(2007; 353).

A CASE OF MATTERING AND WORLDING
THROUGH DESIGN
These auto-producing and collective becomings enact
worlds.9 As mentioned earlier, human worlds are far
from universal or homogenous. I will succinctly
exemplify some aspects of how the intersections of
psychological, social, and environmental ecologies may
overlap and how the considerations of these overlaps
may guide the design of artefacts with a project entitled
“Spices-Species”, from my postdoctoral work
“Symbiotic tactics” (2013-2016)10. The project
7

See: Maturana and Varela 1998. For sympoiesis see Haraway
2016.
8
See: Gary Genosko in Guattari 2008; 71.
9
Note that here, a ‘world’ differs from an ‘environment’; in
the words of Francisco Varela “On the one hand, a body
interacts with its environment in a straight-forward way. These
interactions are of the nature of macrophysical encounters –
sensory transduction, mechanical performance, and so on–
nothing surprising about them. However, this coupling is
possible only if the encounters are embraced from the
perspective of the system itself. This embrace requires the
elaboration of a surplus signification based on this
perspective; it is the origin of the cognitive agent’s world.
Whatever is encountered in the environment must be valued or
not and interacted with or not. This basic assessment of
surplus signification cannot be divorced from the way in
which the coupling event encounters a functioning perceptuomotor unit” (Varela 1999; 55-56).
10
Financed by the Swedish Research Council (project diary
number: 438-2013-297). All projects developed within
“Symbiotic tactics” were conceived keeping in mind the
overlaps of this triple and diffracted register and with the

No 8 (2019): NORDES 2019: WHO CARES?, ISSN 1604-9705. Espoo, Finland. www.nordes.org

3

explicitly works with psychological and social aspects
as they overlap with environmental ones. I briefly
present it here as one of my efforts to articulate how the
decisions to work with designs for and from local
ecosystems and in relation to other-than-human beings
can be understood as gestures of care through design (in
all their tensions). Also, and more importantly, as a
situated and contextualized effort that might help to
imagine further and in other contexts what one might
mean by intersectionality for ecological caring through
design.
In “Ecologizing, decolonizing. An artefactual
perspective”, I wrote that the ‘newness’ of the artefact
that we proposed, lied “in its attempt at de-linking from
anthropocentrism to extend our sense of self so that
ecological belonging acknowledges other scales of
being, a becoming-with, a becoming-through, a
becoming-for and… It exposes us to the short
sightedness of not caring for the companion species that
cohabit with us (whether we like them or not), and on
which we are dependent upon” (2017; 6). The project
does not propose an expansionist model, but the
responsible use of local materials and understanding of
local species for a reestablishment of affective bonds; a
de-linking from ‘growth’ and a re-linking to the
processes of living and dying.
The project was framed keeping in mind “species’
correlations to human preferences”, and in that case,
“the general human predilection of floral plants, with
the resulting presence or absence of certain plant species
in the city of Córdoba [Argentina]” (2017; 1), which led
to experimentation with different native plants and the
selection of Passiflora caerulea, a local variety of
passionflower, for its beauty as well as its use as
medicinal and edible plant. For an explanation of the
artefact designed see Ávila 2017, here, I will simply
point out that the proposal included a material
arrangement that made possible: a) the growth of the
plant in different urban contexts (for example gardens or
balconies); b) the use of the artefact by the plant’s main
pollinator, a carpenter bee (as a habitat for nesting, fig.
1); as well as c) the medicinal use of the plant by a
human being (through a set to produce tinctures). This
implies that the design is a result of the constraints
imposed by the behavioural possibilities of at least three
living beings (human, plant, bee).

1 – Female carpenter bee (Xylocopa) as it would ideally nest using the
set to grow the passionflower.

2 – Carpenter bees of this species (Xylocopa Artifex) circumnavigate
cane or Eryngium stems assessing the suitability of the plant for
nesting, landing occasionally on its stalk and ‘tapping’ onto it before
they decide on a place to perforate its wall.

Having designed with the concern for the environmental
implications of human preferences for floral plants, the
artefact materializes the partial connections11of (some)
humans: those interested in traditional medicine, those
interested in the plant for its fruits, or those that
appreciate the beauty of its flowers; and those of (some)
nonhumans: the carpenter bees that seek the
passionflower for its abundant nectar and pollinate the
plants they visit, the butterflies that lay eggs and feed on
it as caterpillars, or the birds that feed on its fruits.
There are partial connections emerging from the
intersections of the three ecologies, all of them

ambition to challenge anthropocentric ways of being and
doing. The shortness of this essay does not allow me to
expand on these and other potential examples. See also Ávila
and Ernstson (Forthcoming 2019).
11
Partial connections is a concept developed in dialogue
between Donna Haraway and Marylin Strathern. The concept
offers “the possibility of conceptualizing entities (or
collectives) with relation integrally implied, thus disrupting
them as units; emerging from the relation, entities are intrarelated (Barad 2007) instead of being inter-related… instead

4

of plurality (a feature premised on units) the mathematical
image congenial to partial connections is that of fractals: they
offer the possibility of describing irregular bodies that escape
Euclidean geometrical measurements because their borders
also allow other bodies in -whithout, however, touching each
other everywhere… Thus intra-connected, and therefore not
units, fractal bodies also resist being divided into ‘parts and
holes’ (Strathern 2004), for this is a quality of units.” (De la
Cadena 2015; 32 emphasis in the original).

materially entangled, making differences for some-one,
for some-thing, some-how. The “environmental
ecology” is enacted by the relations of myriad organic
and inorganic systems, and in the case of living beings,
their own worlds, each species’ umwelt. 12 This implies
that within Guattari’s environmental ecology we have to
consider the umwelten of multiple beings. Each of the
beings participating in an environment would have a
“psychological” and a social ecology of their own. Like
with the acknowledgement of human worlds, when we
recognise the presence of other-than-human living
beings, we must acknowledge their worlds and their
behavioural modes of enaction. The triple register of the
three ecologies is diffracted, and each world can be
understood intra-actively in its overlapping and
mutually constitutive interference.

with new forms of subjectivity and a design practice
that questions degrees of anthropocentrism.

In terms of care, and as a human user of this artefact,
there are psychological (social and environmental)
tensions through the relations with the plant by
engaging with its maintenance, the food and medicine
that it may provide to us, our appreciation of its beauty
(ugliness, growth, decay), our apprehension or
appreciation of the relation with the bees or the feeding
on the plant by the caterpillars, to name a few.
Regardless of the amount of questions that the artefact
manages to respond to, from a human perspective, and
rather than emphasizing cultural diversity, the project
stresses how different modes of human understanding
lead to the enactment of different worlds, in this
example through the value systems that result in the
contrasts between allopathic medicine and “alternative”
medicine, and their ecological implications if care for
the plant and species that relate to them are taken into
account.

Understanding the implications of all possible
ecological inter and intra-actions is unachievable. Each
of the three spheres occur simultaneously but not
separately, diffracting each other’s influence and
resulting in the lived experience of organisms and in
differences in the environmental reality of which they
participate and enact. With this in mind, what I propose
is a multimodal explorative framework that cannot
explicate all implications, but that may allow us to
remain sensitive to other’s semiotic and behavioural
capacities in an attempt to increase ‘reflexivity’,
awareness and care. As such it departs from the
intersectionality of the three ecologies as a relational
conceptual frame to identify the intersections of
different beings’ umwelten. Each being identified will
be constituted by: A psychological dimension to be
considered that acknowledges the conditions for degrees
of consciousness and semiotic freedom of the being in
question. A social dimension to be considered that
acknowledges the social capacities for inter and intra
species communication of the being in question. An
ecological dimension to be considered that
acknowledges the physical, chemical, thermodynamic
and metabolic processes that enact the possibilities of
living.

Considering the beings addressed by this artefact, the
project also emphasizes the need to account for other
beings’ capacities for adaptation and cohabitation.
While acknowledging power asymmetries, the project
designs ecologies of practices that enable ecologies of
care (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017) and a caring for
ecologies.13 In the same way that Guattari’s
transversalist conception of subjectivity escapes the
individual-social distinction, this transversalist
diffracted approach to the three ecologies seeks to
escape the human-centred and dichotomies such as
nature-culture. This project is an attempt in this
direction, to re-link to the living and do otherwise,
navigating the natureculture continuum to experiment
12
Jacob von Uexküll’s notion of umwelt designates a sphere
of the senses, a perceptual world in which an organism exists
and acts, and thus, indicates the partiality of every species’
perceptions and constitution of their world. (Uexküll 2010).
Uexküll’s welt (world) is composed of the Innenwelten,
Umwelten and Gegenwelten, which Yogi Hendlin summarises
as follows; Innenwelt, the physiological self-guidance system;
the Gegenwelt, the “counter-world” in the animal’s nervous
system that mirrors external impressions, and the Umwelt, the
external world as it shows up to a given organism (Hendlin
2016; 96. Hendlin raises the question of “how to make sense

At times, Guattari sought to overcome dualism by
working with triads (three ecologies) and also models of
four (fluxes, phylums, universes, territories), and always
understood that “transversality was only livable
according to diverse modalities”14. Keeping in mind that
features of transversality are attention to local contexts,
diverse modalities and processes, a diffractive approach
to the three ecologies should be conceived with
attention to multiple dynamisms of the biotic-abiotic
continuum.

MULTIMODAL AND DYNAMIC

By ‘diffracting’ the three ecologies, we may,
methodologically, engage in the ethico-aesthetic
paradigm that Guattari called “Chaosmosis”, and its
potential for engendering conditions for “unprecedented
formations of subjectivity” (Guattari 1995; 91), by
explicitly engaging in modes of sympoiesis and
ecological becomings. The task involves the challenge
of the multiplicity of intersecting [endo and exo]semiotic
channels” (2016; 95), suggesting that the Uexküllian
functional cycle of perception results and emerges through the
diffracted “coincident interpenetrating layers of semiosis”
(2016; 95). Hendlin asserts multiplicity and specificity by
combining the Deleuzian (and Guattarian) concept of
multiplicity with Jacob von Uexküll’s through a diffractive
reading of the notion of Welt (world).
13
See also Stengers, “Introductory notes on an ecology of
practices” (2005).
14
Genosko in Guattari 2008; 77-78.
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of inter/intraspecies communication, and the minimum
of human consideration and acknowledgement of otherthan-human modes of semiosis.

diversity (types of participants) and magnitude (types of
interactions based on the typology) of the semiotic
events.

Throughout his work, Guattari paid attention to semiosis
and questioned the centrality of structuralist linguisticbased semiotics and constantly attempted to explain and
expand semiotic registers of pre-linguistic modes of
signification. Although the work of Uexküll and
Bateson15 appear in Guattari’s work, the field of studies
today called “Ecosemiotics” and “Biosemiotics” had not
emerged as a differentiated field of studies.16 With the
advent of Ecosemiotics/biosemiotics also comes a
relational and enactive understanding of human
semiosis or anthroposemiosis (which the structuralist
and linguistic approaches developed and studied)17, that
influences the anthropocentrism of not only the field of
semiotics, but also of ecology, evident through the
scales at which it has traditionally operated (see Estes et
al. 2018). To understand a semiotic event,
ecosemiotician Timo Maran proposes a scheme for
Semiotic Event Analysis (SEA)18, that consists in the
study of the stages of semiotic events:

Understanding that every design intervention brings
something new to the world and modifies environments,
that is, it creates differences that make differences
(information; Bateson 2000; 318; Barad 2007; 36), and
that these new configurations afford new possibilities of
behaviour, then, a general knowledge of human sign
processes and systems, as well as knowledge of species
sign systems and umwelts (based on ethology and
physiology), and knowledge about the particular
environment (both ecosemiotic and ecological), would
allow not only for analysis, but also for speculating
upon the potential modes of intra/inter-action of those
that participate and enact those worlds and
environments.

1) General knowledge of human sign processes and
systems; documenting significant semiotic events adhoc in the given place and time;
2) Describing the semiotic events qualitatively based on
a), knowledge of species sign systems and umwelts
(based on ethology and physiology), and b), knowledge
about the particular environment (both ecosemiotic and
ecological);
3) Creating typologies of semiotic events based on the
participants (agencies) and meanings related to the
particular events;
4) Making quantitative analysis of the given semiotic
environment based on the total count of interactions,
15

The Three Ecologies starts with a quote of a famous
paragraph from Bateson; “there is an ecology of bad ideas, just
as there is an ecology of weeds” (Bateson 2000; 492). Guattari
was, however, also critical of Bateson in some respects, which
in my understanding makes Guattari more Uexküllian in the
way he, in The Three Ecologies, understands “worlds”, for
example: “Gregory Bateson has clearly shown that what he
calls the ‘ecology of ideas’ cannot be contained within the
domain of the psychology of the individual, but organizes
itself into systems or ‘minds’, the boundaries of which no
longer coincide with the participant individuals. But I part
company with Bateson when he treats action and enunciation
as mere parts of an ecological subsystem called ‘context’. I
myself consider that existential taking on of context is always
brought about by a praxis which is established in the rupture
of the systemic ‘pretext’. There is no overall hierarchy for
locating and localizing the components of enunciation at a
given level. They are composed of heterogeneous elements
that take on a mutual consistency and persistence as they cross
the thresholds that constitute one world at the expense of
another” (2008; 36). Guattari’s emphasis on the “existential
taking” of context and the constitution of worlds at the
expense of another, indicates his understanding of umwelt
theory and even his and Deleuze’s appreciation of the
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Guattari, a political activist as much as a psychiatrist
and a philosopher, cultivated dissensus and attended to
the constant reconstitution of worlds, emphasising that
“it is important not to homogenise various levels of
practice or to make connections between them under
some transcendental supervision, but instead engage the
in processes of heterogenesis.”19 The monocultures that
erase heterogeneity are not only those that we created
through certain practices of agriculture, but more
generally, those that we created (and still create) by
material and anthropocentric practices that acknowledge
no other but some human beings.
Returning to “Spices-species”, one can question the
materialisation of this artefact more systematically using
SEA and study the stages of semiotic events.
Exemplifying with the knowledge that helped us shape
the artefact by paying attention to the carpenter bee, we
addressed 2) and 3) (of Maran’s SEA model) and asked;
how does this species of bee seek and select the most
Uexküllian melodic conception of nature where beings act in
“counterpoint” to each other. See for example Deleuze and
Guattari 1994 [1991]; 185; and (antedating The Tree
Ecologies) 2004 [1980]; 283, 346.
16
These “fields” emerge more clearly during the 1990’s and
early 2000s; see: Hoffmeyer 2008; Maran and Kull 2014.
During Guattari’s lifetime ecology had been mostly under the
influence of physics, reason why “the last decades focused
mainly on the discovery or conﬁrmation of universal natural
laws, predominantly on absorption, transformation, and
processing of energy and matter.” (Bruni 2011; 145).
17
See: Paul Bains’ “Umwelten” (2001), especially as Bains
weaves anthroposemiosis (John Deely) to comment on
Deleuze and Guattari’s “postulates of linguistics” p. 148-149.
18
As presented by Timo Maran, “Semiotic Event Analysis
(SEA) for Multispecies Environments”, at the conference
Semiotics of Hybrid Natures. Anthropogenic Ecosystems,
Multimodalities, Transformed Umwelts. Tartu, Estonia.
November 2018. Publication forthcoming.
19
2008; 34. Guattari continues “…Particular cultures should
be left to deploy themselves in inventing other contracts of
citizenship. Ways should be found to enable the singular, the
exceptional, the rare, to coexist with a State structure that is
the least burdensome possible” (2008; 34).

appropriate hollow wood for nesting? What are the
perceptive clues that the bees seek, and that we as
designers acknowledged in the material configurations?
(Figure 2). Do the female offspring return to the place
they were born for nesting when adults? Knowing that
that is the case, is the artefact long-lasting or able to
acknowledge somehow this need? These and many
other questions helped us shape the artefact and decide
on the potential processes once we acknowledged and
studied the presence of other beings with different
perceptual and behavioral capacities.
The list and the proposals are incomplete, what is
important to emphasize is that design, conceived
relationally, must “cultivate sensitivity to the various
unexpected semiotic channels at work” (Hendlin 2016;
96), human and other-than-human. Read in this key, the
efforts to design these artefacts can be understood as
care in their life-affirming search, and as ecologies of
practice that have the potential to maintain caring and
develop new sensitivities and relations.20 The overlap in
the ‘intersection’ human-and-bee through this particular
material configuration, leads to engaging with other
scales and other tensions (possibilities to and for affect)
than the more common human-and-plant relations and
human-and-plant-and-soil relations. Something that
alters the perception of all of them (an aggregate that is
greater than the sum of its parts), increasing the
perception of ‘depth’ of and in these entanglements.
Something that may expand adaptive capabilities of all
species involved.

CONCLUDING
One of the implications of understanding The Three
Ecologies as a ‘macro intersectional’ methodology is
that it highlights that what has normally been
understood as “intersectionality”, are issues at stake that
enact a human social dimension. In this light, what has
been historically understood as intersectionality can be
expanded to think and nuance the intersections of not
only human social dimensions but also the
psychological and environmental in their interrelation
with each other. The notion of “diffraction” in
combination with “ecologies” help us better understand
intra-relatedness and avoid thinking in terms of “units”
(such as a “section” that can be divided into parts);
something that the prefix “inter” (as in “intersection”)
still suggests; the relation between separate and defined
entities. In spite of this, I believe that, like the concept
of ecology, both intersectionality and diffraction, are
relational concepts and, as such, useful to think modes
of what Guattari called transversality.
Because design enacts novel configurations that affect
all kind of beings, a relational approach should imply a
decentring of the human, so that the differences that

make a difference that humans generate could also
acknowledge other-than-human ways of being.
Designing ecologies of practices that enable ecologies
of care and a caring for ecologies; design cultures can
acknowledge the presence and the relational modes of
other-than-human beings, to expand possibilities for
cohabitation and learn new nuances of meaning by
attending to the power asymmetries among humans as
well as the power asymmetries with and among otherthan-humans.
In his last book Guattari wrote; “An ecology of the
virtual is thus just as pressing as ecologies of the visible
world. And in this regard, poetry, music, the plastic arts,
the cinema —particularly in their performance or
performative modalities— have an important role to
play, with their specific contribution and as a paradigm
of reference in new social and analytic practices
(psychoanalytic in the broadest sense). Beyond the
relation of actualised forces, virtual ecology will not
simply attempt to preserve the endangered species of
cultural life but equally to engender conditions for the
creation and development of unprecedented formations
of subjectivity that have never been seen and never felt.
This is to say that generalised ecology —or ecosophy—
will work as a science of ecosystems, as a bid for
political regeneration, and as an ethical, aesthetic and
analytic engagement. It will tend to create new systems
of valorisation, a new taste for life, a new gentleness”
(1995; 91-92). A gentleness that might help us sense
and care for whom and how our worldings matter.
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